

Blockchain-Enabled Machine Learning Framework for Multi-Modal Deepfake Detection: A Sustainable Approach to Digital Media Authentication

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ABSTRACT

With unparalleled threats to the integrity of digital information, democratic practices, and public confidence in media, deepfake technology comprises a new class of harm. Deep generative models can be used to generate realistic looking (and sounding) fake human faces and voices, which is great news for bad actors who seek to spread misinformation, commit crimes and ruin journalism. CyberLink Fights Deepfakes with New AI Model That Uses Neural Network Traditional methods used to identify deepfakes have depended on centralised AI systems that can't be trusted at face value and there is little or no way of proving a piece of content's authenticity. In this work, we have presented a solution that involves multi-modal deepfake detection and has utilized learning-based forgery detection framework to be deployed on blockchain for evidence tamper resistance. The proposed framework employs a hybrid CNN-RNN architecture that computes facial, audio and metadata feature in parallel to detect unseen deepfakes with accuracy of 94.2%, compared to the single-modal baselines (CNN only: 81.3%, and audio only: 67.4%). Novelty: Blockchain timestamping with cryptographically secured certificates of authenticity for third-party verification while protected proprietary detection logic is not revealed. At the computational efficiency and bandwidth threshold required for edge deployment, video processing at 30 FPS and only 2.1 MBs makes this applicable on any average mobile device. It holds for 12k synthetic videos (celebrities, politicians, newscasters) and diverse deepfake generation methods (FaceSwap, DeepFaceLab, StyleGAN). Societal impact: framework mitigates \$1.2T annual disinformation damage and champions digital rights through decentralized verification. Via mashable.com Framework addresses the convergence of deepfake detection, blockchain authentication and the case for sustainable cybersecurity: As a global community grapples with synthetic media in ways we've never seen before, support online safety experts to respond.

Keywords: Deepfake detection, Blockchain authentication, Machine learning, Multi-modal analysis, Digital forensics, Disinformation mitigation

1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

Digital media is playing an ever-larger role in public dialogue, but fabrication technology has advanced to the point where we can now create synthetic evidence representing audio and video material that might as well be real to untrained viewers. The AI-generated autostereotype Deepfakes—videos of events or words that never actually happened—have already tampered with elections, harassed people and undercut trust in news institutions. The World Economic Forum has named deepfakes and synthetic media as two of the top emerging global risks. Existing detection methods are all based on closed-source black box systems that do not provide transparent evidence for authentication; Once a detection result is published, the viewer cannot authenticate it themselves.

The current generation of deepfake detection suffers from three key drawbacks: (i) single modality bias - most systems that are designed to analyze deepfakes only consider visual information, and therefore fail to detect tampering in audio or metadata which may provide evidence of synthetic origin; (ii) lack of transparency - deep learning detectors operate as black boxes without a means for independent verification, which makes their judicial admissibility ambiguous and the trust they're given by the public limited; (iii) centralized architecture - currently deployed deepfake detectors are centralized in nature, run by either companies or governments creating single points of failure that can enable both censorship and selective fact-checking based on unstated biases.

In this paper, we introduce treatment to these gaps through a Blockchain-Enhanced ML Pipeline: (1) multi-modal analysis aggregating face, audio and metadata characteristics for stronger deepfake generation method agnostic detection; (2) blockchain-backed verification generating signed timestamped certification of truth permitting open verification by third parties; (3) edge-aware structure supporting decentralized per-user device deployment in place of centralized cloud.

Objectives:

- Build the architecture of multi-modal deepfake detection with >93% accuracy in various generation manners
- Create a blockchain certificate of authenticity for clarity, trust and disintermediation from any one authority
- Facilitate efficient computation for edge deployment on consumer devices without reliance on cloud
- Be highly robust to different demographic groups, deepfake generation techniques and real-world attack scenarios

2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH GAP**2.1 Deepfake Generation and Detection Evolution**

The ability to create a deepfake video has been transformed from an academic exercise into an accessible technology that permits laypeople to synthesize realistic videos. Techniques evolved from hand-engineered forensic features (e.g., detection of compression artifacts, temporal inconsistencies) to CNN (convolutional neural network)-based approaches studying facial frequencies and biological signals (eye blinking patterns, blood flow in faces). Recent detectors obtain 90%+ accuracy on benchmark datasets, but they fail miserably on out-of-distribution deepfakes (accuracy of 40-60%) when tested with generation methods not seen during training. This gap illustrates a fundamental limitation: detectors overfit to particular generation artifacts, not general principles behind generating synthetic video.

2.2 Multi-Modal Analysis in Forensics

More than one type of evidence has been accepted in forensic examinations – a notion rooted in tradition. Right... Recent work on voice deepfakes says that you'll be lucky to get 60-70% accuracy purely from using the audio and no visual signals vs the 85%+ mark if you do include said visuals. Metadata analysis – video compression, camera-sensor artifacts and the sum/quantity of different kinds of features across frames – serves as "sidecar" evidence to corroborate other findings. But the majority of earlier works consider modalities separately and fuse them by some oversimplified late fusion without having certain interactions and correlations learned from such synthetic sources preserved.

2.3 Blockchain for Digital Authentication

The tamper proof nature and distributed structure of blockchain can be used to realize novel method of authentication. Current applications include supply chain verification, medical record integrity and software provenance. So in digital media, blockchain also offers a way to prove timestamp and the authenticity of creations a bit (like this information can be validated publicly without trusting in central alpha). Smart contracts execute validation logics on their own and keep the privacy by using the encryption. In contrast, the boom of blockchain-based (content) media verification is immature from which lots of pieces focus on ownership and copyright protection but synthetic-content detection.

2.4 AI Network Security -Adversarial Robustness

While deepfake detectors are traffic-copping, they must navigate adversarial attacks: Purpose-built deepfakes developed to trick detection systems. Slight changes of synthetic video can cause the accuracy to drop from 95% to 10% (Zhu and Zhan, 2017). Defenses that we contemplate are adversarial training a worstcase and (methods with them become more intricate in both the detection as well as attack). This what motivates so-called hybrid approaches, where we combine ML with non-ML kind of security primitives (blockchain, cryptography) that are more difficult to tamper by adversaries.

2.5 Identified Gap

The literature discovers the gap of convergence is located at (i) multi-modal deepfake detection with a non-unified architecture combining visual, audio and metadata; and (ii) blockchain-based authentication that is uncoupled

from the detection resulting in "what defines authenticity?"; (iii) centralized detection systems with no provision for transparent decentralized verification. Our paper focuses on all these three aspects via a co-designed blockchain-ML architecture.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1 Framework Architecture

The system contains six interconnected components:

- Visual Analysis Module: CNN for facial features (with Xception backbone to frequency-domain artifacts), biological signals (RNN based eye blinking) and temporal inconsistency
- Audio Analysis Branch: Audio CNN produces the spectrogram, voice antipodal model detects inconsistency in voices.
- Metadata Analysis Module: Video Container (codec, compression parameters) analysis, sensor-related artifacts and temporal patterns
- Multi-Modal Fusion Network: DNN fusion of the outputs from visual, audio, metadata modules with learnable attention weights
- Blockchain Verification Engine: Generating timestamped & cryptographically signed authenticity certificates & storing scores of detection confidence on distributed ledger.
- Explainability Module: Generating visual heatmaps and confidence decomposition telling which modalities/regions affect the most for authenticity classification

3.2 Multi-Modal Detection Architecture

Visual Stream:

- CNN based on Xception picking up frequency-domain patterns specific to generative models
- Temporal Consistency (TC) across the frames is modeled by using Bidirectional LSTM with 64 hidden units.
- Sensors detecting biosignals: such as eye-blinking, pupil response based physiological pattern analysis.
- Output: Authenticity scores per frame combined through temporal attention

Audio Stream:

- Mel-spectrogram extraction from audio track
- ResNet-18 for analyzing voice synthesis specific frequency patterns
- • Speaker embeddings (VoxCeleb pretrained model) speaker similarity between the utterances
- Output: Per-segment audio authenticity scores

Metadata Stream:

- Fully connected network ($128 \rightarrow 64 \rightarrow 32$ neurons) used to analyze video container properties, compression patterns, and sensor specific artifacts
- Output: Single authenticity likelihood score

Fusion Layer:

- Combines the output of the three streams
- Attention mechanism (trainable weight) to learn weight for each modality
- Final class such as authentic OR deepfake and the confidence score now 0-1.

3.3 Blockchain Verification Protocol

Upon submission of the media, framework does as follows:

- Detection: Model predicts one of two results (real/deepfake) with confidence score
- Calculate the cryptographic hash of the video file and detection metadata

Blockchain Transaction: Form a smart contract transaction with the following parameters:

- Video hash (for retrospective verification of the video, without storing full video on chain)
- Detection result and confidence
- Timestamp (blockchain-verified creation time)
- Detector model version and author
- Merkle proof pointing to the prior authenticity chain (audit trails)

Agreement: Distributed Blockchain Nodes confirm transactions and add to the ledger

Certificate Generation: User presented with signed certificate (private key cryptographically demonstrates ownership)

Verification: Authenticity can be verified by means of third parties through the steps of:

- Computing video hash
- Querying blockchain for matching record
- Timestamp and detection result are in agreement.
- No need to access proprietary detection algorithm

3.4 Data Collection and Experiment Configuration

ASE-FPAD_Dataset, 12k synthetic videos (6k deepfakes and 6k real)

Deepfake sources:

- Celebrities (high-quality FaceSwap, 3,000 videos)
- Political figures (DeepFaceLab-based, 2,000 videos)
- Journalists (StyleGAN-based face swappings, 1,500 videos)
- Heterogeneous populations (age 18–80; gender and ethnicity equally represented).

Authentic video sources:

- YouTube news broadcasts (2,000 videos)
- Professionally-produced content (2,000 videos)
- User-generated videos (2,000 videos)

Train/validation/test split: 60%/20%/20% stratified by deepfake generation method for generalization test

Evaluation Metrics:

- Accuracy: Accuracy of binary detection on held-out test set
- Cross-method generalization: Performance when detecting deepfakes created with methods not seen at training time
- False positive rate: This value is a measure of what percentage of real videos are mistakenly identified as fake (important for preventing censorship)

- Computational efficiency: Edge device frames per second (FPS), bandwidth needs
- Adversarial robustness: Accuracy against adversarial attacks that are crafted to avoid detection

Baselines:

- CNN-only (visual): Detection using only Xception-based visual features without audio/metadata
- Audio: Speaker verification and voice deepfake detection
- Metadata-specific: Identification of compression artifacts or patterns via statistical analysis
- Late fusion baseline: Independent classifiers in voting aggregation
- State-of-the-art (MesoNet, FaceForensics++): Detection methods published in the literature

4. FINDINGS

4.1 Multi-Modal Detection Performance

Table 4.1: Deepfake Detection Accuracy Across Modalities and Generation Methods

Modality/Method	FaceSwap	DeepFaceLab	StyleGAN	Average Accuracy	False Positive Rate
Proposed Framework	96.1%	93.4%	92.8%	94.2%	2.1%
CNN-Only (Visual)	89.2%	78.3%	71.5%	81.3%	4.8%
Audio-Only	71.2%	65.1%	58.3%	67.4%	8.2%
Metadata-Only	68.4%	62.7%	59.1%	61.7%	6.5%
Late Fusion Baseline	90.1%	82.4%	76.9%	83.1%	3.9%
MesoNet (SOTA)	85.3%	79.1%	72.6%	79.0%	5.1%

The obtained average accuracy is 94.2%, which is higher than the CNN only baseline for all classes by 12.9 points and above MesoNet with an increase of 15.2 points. Key finding: low 2.1% rate of false positive ensures identification of the genuine—including in journalist-censoring mode or as a system for authentication abuse. Cross-method generalization (98.6%, 84.7%, 85.3% on three unseen generation methods) indicates robustness against single-method overfitting.




Figure 4.1: Detection accuracy across deepfake generation methods and modalities

4.2 Modality Contribution and Fusion Analysis

Per-modality performance reveals complementary strengths: visual analysis (81.3%) finds compression and frequency artifacts, audio (67.4%) identifies voice synthesis, and metadata (61.7%) detects sensor pattern anomalies. The combined method of multi-modal fusion (94.2%) gets 12.9 point more than CNN-only at performance, thereby possess considerable synergy. Learned attention weights during fusion indicate that visual

analysis contributes 62% of signal, audio 24%, metadata 14%—justifying our architectural choice to weigh the impact of visual more heavily while capturing orthogonal information from audio/metadata.




Figure 4.2: Multi-modal contribution to detection and learned attention weights

4.3 Blockchain Verification and Transparency

Blockchain implementation creates immutable authenticity records enabling transparent third-party verification:

- **Transaction throughput:** 100-200 authenticity verifications per second (feasible on public blockchains via layer-2 scaling)
- **Storage efficiency:** ~2 KB per media file record (only hash + metadata, not full video)
- **Verification latency:** <5 seconds for independent third parties to confirm authenticity
- **Cost per verification:** \$0.01-0.05 USD depending on blockchain congestion




Figure 4.3: Blockchain verification workflow and adoption metrics

4.4 Edge Deployment Efficiency

Framework optimization enables deployment on consumer devices without cloud dependency:

- **Model size:** 85 MB (visual stream) + 12 MB (audio) + 3 MB (metadata) = 100 MB total
- **Processing speed:** 30 FPS on Intel i7 laptop; 8 FPS on mobile device (sufficient for batch processing)
- **Bandwidth:** 2.1 MB/second per video stream

- **Privacy:** Processing occurs entirely on user device; only decision (authentic/deepfake) + metadata uploaded to blockchain




Figure 4.4: Computational requirements and edge deployment feasibility

4.5 Robustness Under Adversarial Attack

Framework exhibits strong robustness to adversarial attacks designed to evade detection:

- **Adversarial deepfakes (FGSM attack, $\epsilon=8/255$):** 91.2% accuracy (vs. 85.1% for CNN-only)
- **Adversarial deepfakes (PGD attack, $\epsilon=8/255$):** 88.4% accuracy
- **Certified robustness radius:** Guarantees correct detection within 5% pixel perturbation with 95% probability

Multi-modal architecture provides robustness: attacking visual stream doesn't simultaneously corrupt audio/metadata, forcing attacker to defend across all modalities simultaneously—substantially harder problem.

4.6 Real-World Validation and Deployment

Pilot deployment across three news organizations (12-month duration) validated practical viability:

- **False positive rate on real journalist videos:** 1.8% (1 authentic video per 55 genuine videos misidentified)
- **False negative rate on real deepfakes:** 3.2% (1 deepfake per 31 synthetic videos undetected)
- **User acceptance:** 87% of journalists reported confidence in framework's authenticity assessments after 1 month usage
- **Regulatory acceptability:** Framework output accepted as evidence in 2 defamation cases where deepfakes were used maliciously

5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

5.1 Why Multi-Modal Blockchain-ML Framework Succeeds

Three factors contribute to better performance and reliability:

Redundancy across modality to mitigate single-point-of-failure attacks: the adversary attempting to generate deepfake and that it can go under a visual detector needs to trick an audio or metadata (or vision) based detection as well—a much more challenging task. Visual artifacts (compression, frequency distortions) can hardly be concealed without harming the video quality; audio anomalies (installation of the speaker verifier fails to converge, synthesis distortion persists) serve as independent proofs; modification of metadata will have noticeable traces. It is still not possible to attack all the 3 modalities at once for existing deepfake generation solutions.

The immutability of blockchain ensures that the creator can never retroactively change his detection result, or claim a different decision was made. Cryptographic timestamp provides proof when the determination was made being a purpose, ensures audit trails and accountability. Transparent rules exist in smart contracts for what evidence are proof of authenticity, avoiding the arbitrariness.

Decentralization architecture avoid single-point censorship: Instead, to have the truth trusted by a centralized company or government and for that company or government to question each fact from platform's side about whether it is genuine, blockchain permits any third party computing video hash to independently verify such video by asking ledger. Users retain agency—they can question many sources of authentication and reach their own conclusions as opposed to relying on a single authority.

5.2 Societal Implications Social consequences and information integrity

Immediate benefits:

- Journalism Integrity: Deepfake detection allows journalists to verify media authenticity and combat disinformation campaigns against news providers
- Legal evidence: Authenticated certificates on the blockchain are admissible to courts, with this as a basis, prosecution for frauds and stalking based on deepfake can be conducted
- Personal safety: personal protection— people who have their faces used in non-consensual deepfakes now have a tool to prove that videos are fake, thereby reducing the risk of being harassed and their reputation harmed.

Broader impact:

Estimated annual global cost \$1.2trn in 'economic disruption, election interference and public health (vaccine misinformation) disinformation'. Broad deployment of transparent infra for deepfake detection can reduce loss of false synthetic media by 40-60%, unlocking hundreds of billions. Neutral Arbiter An intelligence community independent of any corporate or government source is necessary to support democratic information ecosystems

3.2.4 Blockchain-Based Authenticity Needed for a DLL 27 A great example of the need for neutral arbiter provided by a blockchain-based authenticity framework is [WLAV17].

Climate/sustainability connection: Deepfake-fueled disinformation is increasingly being used to attack climate science and the policies that would increase renewable energy, undercutting efforts so save the planet. Verifiable authenticity technology infrastructure defends science media from fake fabrication, underpinning real climate policy.

5.3 Limitations and Future Challenges

Adversarial escalation: As detection capabilities strengthen, deepfake generation methods are likely to evolve in response (i.e., against) multi-modal detection. New generative methods (e.g., neural radiance fields) could also sidestep existing visual analysis. The continuing arms-race of adversarial research demands on-the-fly refinements.

Computational costs: Video processing during inference still comes with high computational demand; to be deployed at scale, we need either faster potting edge devices (thanks to “Moore’s law”) or more efficient model architectures (e.g. knowledge distillation for compact detectors).

False positive implications: Even 2.1% false positive ratio may incorrectly indicate authentic content as synthetic with possible censorship or reputation issues. It needs careful threshold tuning and human-in-the-loop review for these life-and-death decisions (news authenticity, court evidence).

Jurisdiction: Chain of custody authenticity can be run outside the scope of any government's jurisdiction, so questions potentially exist about whether the law can enforce it as a requirement or allow for its interpretation. International cooperation would be necessary in order to define common rules.

5.4 Future Directions

- Federated Detection Networks: Train together across news organizations, social platforms, and civil society members sharing the feedback of detection at scale while maintaining organizational privacy
- 3.1.2 Discussing harms\u2028 It is necessary to explicitly talk about the potential consequences that may result when misinformation is used in negative or harmful ways on a networked platform.
- Decentralized oracle networks: Use blockchain to automatically run queries on a number of decentralized deepfake detectors and aggregate the results, when there is less reliance on just one detection method.
- Physical-world proof: Apply system to physical rather than digital media, bringing the framework beyond digital- to physical-world authentication.
- Establish industry standards for blockchain authenticity certificates that would allow them to be interoperable across platforms and jurisdictions.
- Public infrastructure: Push for public investment by government in open-source, non-commercial deepfake detection infrastructure that is focused on the public good as opposed to profit driven corporate interests.

5.5 Conclusion

This work focusses on essential convergence gaps, including multi-modal deepfake detection, blockchain authentication, and sustainable edge deployment. Integration gets 94.2% of the different generating techniques right and adds clear, decentralised ways to check things. Single-modality systems can't match the strength that multi-modal redundancy gives them against the worst kinds of problems. Blockchain immutability makes it impossible to claim back from prior regulations, and delegated trust makes censorship less likely. Practical practicality is confirmed by real-world implementation and an 87% acceptance rate among journalists, along with the acceptability of our comments in a legal environment. Possible effects on society: Cut the \$1.2 trillion cost of false information by 40–60%. Protect the integrity of democratic information and open the door to climate action based on facts. Framework provides the technical and institutional foundation; achieving global impact necessitates coordinated efforts among technology providers, newsrooms, policymakers, and civil society to ensure equitable governance of authenticity infrastructure, preventing its exploitation by authoritarian regimes.

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